Constitutional Development: 1935 to 1947

The Cabinet Mission was led by Lord Pethick-Lawrence, the Secretary of State for India in Clement Attlee's Labour Government. Its other two members were Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade, who had led the 1942 mission, and A.V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty. The Mission reached Delhi on 24 March 1946, held talks with the Congress, the League and other groups, and issued its plan on 16 May 1946. The Viceroy, Lord Wavell, took part in the negotiations but was not a member of the Mission.

Punjab was in Section B, together with the North-West Frontier Province and Sind, the Muslim-majority provinces of the north-west. Section A had the six Hindu-majority provinces: Madras, Bombay, the United Provinces, Bihar, the Central Provinces and Orissa. Section C had Bengal and Assam. Each section was to frame the constitutions of its provinces and decide whether to form a group. The Congress objected that compulsory sectioning would force Assam, which had a Hindu majority, into a group dominated by Bengal, and that the NWFP, which had a Congress ministry, would be pushed into Section B; this dispute over grouping was one reason the plan broke down.

Statements 1, 2 and 4 are correct. By March 1942 Japan had overrun Malaya and Singapore and taken Rangoon, and Britain was under pressure from the United States, China and its own Labour members to win Indian support. Stafford Cripps, Lord Privy Seal and a member of the War Cabinet, reached India in late March 1942. Statement 3 is wrong: the offer was of dominion status after the war, and during the war defence was to remain under British control, which was a main reason for its rejection. Gandhi's description of it as a 'post-dated cheque' became famous. The failure of the mission led to the Quit India resolution of August 1942.

The significance of the August Offer lies in its admission that the framing of a new constitution should be primarily the responsibility of Indians themselves, through a representative body to be set up after the war. Spectrum puts it as the first acknowledgement of the inherent right of Indians to frame their own constitution. Until then, every constitution for India, from 1773 to 1935, had been drawn up by the British Parliament after British-led inquiries such as the Simon Commission. The offer still stopped well short of nationalist demands: it promised dominion status, not independence, and nothing was to happen until the war ended.

Statements 1, 2 and 3 are correct. The August Offer was announced by Lord Linlithgow on 8 August 1940, when Britain, after the fall of France, wanted Indian cooperation in the war. It named dominion status as the objective, proposed to expand the Viceroy's Executive Council with more Indians and to set up a War Advisory Council, and said that after the war a representative Indian body would frame the constitution. It also assured the minorities that power would not be transferred to a government whose authority was denied by large and powerful elements, a clause that in effect gave the Muslim League a veto. Statement 4 is wrong: the Congress rejected the offer, and Gandhi soon launched individual satyagraha.

Statements 1, 2 and 3 are correct. The Wavell Plan, broadcast in June 1945 and discussed at the Simla Conference, proposed to reconstitute the Executive Council within the existing constitution. Apart from the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief (who kept the war portfolio), all members were to be Indians, and external affairs, except tribal and frontier matters, would also go to an Indian member. There was to be parity between caste Hindus and Muslims. A British High Commissioner would be appointed, as in the dominions, to represent British commercial and other interests. Statement 4 is wrong: the Viceroy kept his power of veto; Wavell only indicated that it would be used sparingly and on the advice of the ministers.

Statements 1, 2 and 3 are correct. The Mission examined the League's demand and rejected a sovereign Pakistan, whether of six provinces or a smaller one, as neither practicable nor a solution to the minorities problem. Instead it proposed a three-tier structure: a Union of British India and the states limited to foreign affairs, defence and communications, with the powers needed to finance them; provinces with all other subjects and the residuary powers; and groups of provinces, free to form their own executives and legislatures. Statement 4 is wrong: the constitution-making body was to be elected indirectly by the members of the newly elected provincial assemblies, roughly one seat for every million people, with seats allotted community-wise, not by direct adult franchise.

Three of them were part of the proposals. The Draft Declaration of 1942 promised that, after the war, a constitution-making body would be set up, its British Indian members elected by the newly elected provincial assemblies and the states' members nominated by the rulers, so provision 1 was included. A province unwilling to accept the new constitution could stay out and make its own agreement with Britain; this provincial opt-out was read by the Congress as a door to partition, so provision 2 was included. Defence was to stay under British control during the war, so provision 3 was included. Provision 4 is wrong: the Indian Union was to be a dominion free to decide its relationship with the Commonwealth, including leaving it.