Global Issues: Maritime security

White shipping is the term for commercial, non-military merchant shipping; exchanging advance information on such vessels (their identity, cargo and movements) helps navies and coast guards build maritime domain awareness and pick out suspicious ships. Information on naval vessels is called grey shipping and is not covered by these arrangements. India has signed white-shipping agreements with many partners, and the information feeds the IFC-IOR at Gurugram; in March 2025 India and Mauritius agreed to strengthen such cooperation.

After the 11 September 2001 attacks, the IMO's Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security adopted the ISPS Code in December 2002 together with a new chapter XI-2 of SOLAS (the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea), which makes the Code's mandatory part binding. It entered into force on 1 July 2004 and requires ships on international voyages and the port facilities serving them to carry out security assessments and plans and to appoint security officers. MARPOL concerns pollution, UNCLOS is the general law of the sea, and SUA criminalises unlawful acts against ships.

IORA adopted six priority areas at its Council of Ministers in India (Bengaluru, 2011): maritime safety and security, trade and investment facilitation, fisheries management, disaster risk management, academic, science and technology cooperation, and tourism and cultural exchanges. Two cross-cutting areas were added later: the blue economy and women's economic empowerment. Countering terrorist financing is not an IORA priority area; it is the domain of bodies such as the FATF. Hence only three.

In February 2022 the Government appointed Vice Admiral G. Ashok Kumar (Retd) as India's first National Maritime Security Coordinator. The post, created with the approval of the Cabinet Committee on Security, sits in the National Security Council Secretariat and reports to the National Security Adviser. It is meant to coordinate the Navy, the Coast Guard, coastal States and Union Territories, and the ministries of shipping, fisheries, home and external affairs, a gap noticed since the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

Ensuring Secure Seas, issued as Naval Strategic Publication 1.2, was released by the Indian Navy on 26 October 2015, replacing the 2007 strategy (statement 2 correct). It is a service strategy document, not a law, and is not approved by Parliament (statement 1 wrong). It explains the idea of net security and sets out India's aim of being a net security provider in its maritime neighbourhood, which it distinguishes from acting as a regional policeman (statement 3 correct). Hence 2 and 3 only.

The CSC grew out of a trilateral of India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives on maritime security and is run at the level of National Security Advisers. Mauritius joined later, and Bangladesh was welcomed as the fifth Member State at the 8th Deputy NSA-level meeting on 10 July 2024 (statement 1 correct). The Charter and the MoU for the Secretariat in Colombo were signed there on 30 August 2024 (statement 2 correct). Seychelles attended that July 2024 meeting as an observer, not a member (statement 3 wrong). Hence 1 and 2 only.

The joint press statement of 30 August 2024 lists five pillars: maritime safety and security; countering terrorism and radicalisation; combating trafficking and transnational organised crime; cyber security and protection of critical infrastructure and technology; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. All three given items are pillars. The CSC thus goes well beyond naval matters, which is why it is run by National Security Advisers rather than by navies.

On 12 March 2025 the two Prime Ministers elevated relations to an Enhanced Strategic Partnership (statement 1 correct), and India said it would assist in setting up a Police Academy and a National Maritime Information Sharing Centre in Mauritius, while supporting the security of the Mauritian EEZ and its Coast Guard (statement 2 correct). Statement 3 is wrong: the Agalega airstrip and jetty, inaugurated on 29 February 2024, were fully financed by India, not built on a loan. Hence only two.

Neither statement is correct (d). Statement 1 is wrong: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (signed 2016) had only 12 Pacific Rim economies, not all of them except China and Russia; countries such as South Korea and Indonesia were outside it. Statement 2 is wrong: the TPP was a trade and investment agreement, not a maritime security alliance.

The US withdrew in 2017, and the remaining 11 signed the CPTPP in 2018. The UK joined in 2024. China has applied to join. Notice how the TPP contrasts with RCEP, a separate Asia-Pacific trade bloc that India chose to leave in 2019.

Answer as per the official UPSC answer key.

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Neither statement is correct (d). IORA, founded in 1997 in Mauritius and renamed in 2013, is not a recent body formed in response to piracy or oil spills, so statement 1 is wrong. It is a regional forum for economic and trade cooperation, covering trade, fisheries, tourism, the blue economy and disaster management, as well as maritime safety, so it is not a security-only alliance.

Its secretariat is in Mauritius, and India is a founding member that chaired it in 2011–13 and again from 2025. Notice how the Indian Ocean links India's trade, energy imports and the SAGAR vision.

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