CSAT (Paper II): previous-year questions

Today’s developing economies use much less energy per capita than developed countries such as the United States did at similar incomes, showing the potential for lower-carbon growth. Adaptation and mitigation need to be integrated into a climate-smart development strategy that increases resilience, reduces the threat of further global warming, and improves development outcomes. Adaptation and mitigation measures can advance development, and prosperity can raise incomes and foster better institutions. A healthier population living in better-built houses and with access to bank loans and social security is better equipped to deal with a changing climate and its consequences. Advancing robust, resilient development policies that promote adaptation is needed today because changes in the climate, already begun, will increase even in the short term.
The spread of economic prosperity has always been intertwined with adaptation to changing ecological conditions. But as growth has altered the environment and as environmental change has accelerated, sustaining growth and adaptability demands greater capacity to understand our environment, generate new adaptive technologies and practices, and diffuse them widely. As economic historians have explained, much of humankind’s creative potential has been directed at adapting to the changing world. But adaptation cannot cope with all the impacts related to climate change, especially as larger changes unfold in the long term.
Countries cannot grow out of harm’s way fast enough to match the changing climate. And some growth strategies, whether driven by the government or the market, can also add to vulnerability — particularly if they overexploit natural resources. Under the Soviet development plan, irrigated cotton cultivation expanded in water-stressed Central Asia and led to the near disappearance of the Aral Sea, threatening the livelihoods of fishermen, herders and farmers. And clearing mangroves — the natural coastal buffers against storm surges — to make way for intensive farming or housing development, increases the physical vulnerability of coastal settlements, whether in Guinea or in Louisiana.

In a typical Western liberal context, deepening of democracy invariably leads to consolidation of ‘liberal values’. In the Indian context, democratization is translated into greater involvement of people not as ‘individuals’ which is a staple to liberal discourse, but as communities or groups. Individuals are getting involved in the public sphere not as ‘atomized’ individuals but as members of primordial communities drawn on religious or caste identity. Community-identity seems to be the governing force. It is not therefore surprising that the so-called peripheral groups continue to maintain their identities with reference to the social groups (caste, religion or sect) to which they belong while getting involved in the political processes despite the fact that their political goals remain more or less identical. By helping to articulate the political voice of the marginalized, democracy in India has led to ‘a loosening of social strictures’ and empowered the peripherals to be confident of their ability to improve the socio-economic conditions in which they are placed. This is a significant political process that had led to a silent revolution through a meaningful transfer of power from the upper caste elites to various subaltern groups within the democratic framework of public governance.

Education, without a doubt, has an important functional, instrumental and utilitarian dimension. This is revealed when one asks questions such as ‘what is the purpose of education ?’. The answers, too often, are ‘to acquire qualifications for employment/upward mobility’, ‘wider/higher (in terms of income) opportunities’, and ‘to meet the needs for trained human power in diverse fields for national development’. But in its deepest sense education is not instrumentalist. That is to say, it is not to be justified outside of itself because it leads to the acquisition of formal skills or of certain desired psychological – social attributes. It must be respected in itself. Education is thus not a commodity to be acquired or possessed and then used, but a process of inestimable importance to individuals and society, although it can and does have enormous use-value. Education then, is a process of expansion and conversion, not in the sense of converting or turning students into doctors or engineers, but the widening and turning out of the mind — the creation, sustenance and development of self-critical awareness and independence of thought. It is an inner process of moral – intellectual development.

Most champions of democracy have been rather reticent in suggesting that democracy would itself promote development and enhancement of social welfare — they have tended to see them as good but distinctly separate and largely independent goals. The detractors of democracy, on the other hand, seemed to have been quite willing to express their diagnosis of what they see as serious tensions between democracy and development. The theorists of the practical split — “Make up your mind : do you want democracy, or instead, do you want development ?” — often came, at least to start with, from East Asian countries, and their voice grew in influence as several of these countries were immensely successful — through the 1970s and 1980s and even later — in promoting economic growth without pursuing democracy.
To deal with these issues we have to pay particular attention to both the content of what can be called development and to the interpretation of democracy (in particular to the respective roles of voting and of public reasoning). The assessment of development cannot be divorced from the lives that people can lead and the real freedom that they enjoy. Development can scarcely be seen merely in terms of enhancement of inanimate objects of convenience, such as a rise in the GNP (or in personal incomes), or industrialization — important as they may be as means to the real ends. Their value must depend on what they do to the lives and freedom of the people involved, which must be central to the idea of development.
If development is understood in a broader way, with a focus on human lives, then it becomes immediately clear that the relation between development and democracy has to be seen partly in terms of their constitutive connection, rather than only through their external links. Even though the question has often been asked whether political freedom is “conducive to development”, we must not miss the crucial recognition that political liberties and democratic rights are among the “constituent components” of development. Their relevance for development does not have to be established indirectly through their contribution to the growth of GNP.

Today’s developing economies use much less energy per capita than developed countries such as the United States did at similar incomes, showing the potential for lower-carbon growth. Adaptation and mitigation need to be integrated into a climate-smart development strategy that increases resilience, reduces the threat of further global warming, and improves development outcomes. Adaptation and mitigation measures can advance development, and prosperity can raise incomes and foster better institutions. A healthier population living in better-built houses and with access to bank loans and social security is better equipped to deal with a changing climate and its consequences. Advancing robust, resilient development policies that promote adaptation is needed today because changes in the climate, already begun, will increase even in the short term.
The spread of economic prosperity has always been intertwined with adaptation to changing ecological conditions. But as growth has altered the environment and as environmental change has accelerated, sustaining growth and adaptability demands greater capacity to understand our environment, generate new adaptive technologies and practices, and diffuse them widely. As economic historians have explained, much of humankind’s creative potential has been directed at adapting to the changing world. But adaptation cannot cope with all the impacts related to climate change, especially as larger changes unfold in the long term.
Countries cannot grow out of harm’s way fast enough to match the changing climate. And some growth strategies, whether driven by the government or the market, can also add to vulnerability — particularly if they overexploit natural resources. Under the Soviet development plan, irrigated cotton cultivation expanded in water-stressed Central Asia and led to the near disappearance of the Aral Sea, threatening the livelihoods of fishermen, herders and farmers. And clearing mangroves — the natural coastal buffers against storm surges — to make way for intensive farming or housing development, increases the physical vulnerability of coastal settlements, whether in Guinea or in Louisiana.

In a typical Western liberal context, deepening of democracy invariably leads to consolidation of ‘liberal values’. In the Indian context, democratization is translated into greater involvement of people not as ‘individuals’ which is a staple to liberal discourse, but as communities or groups. Individuals are getting involved in the public sphere not as ‘atomized’ individuals but as members of primordial communities drawn on religious or caste identity. Community-identity seems to be the governing force. It is not therefore surprising that the so-called peripheral groups continue to maintain their identities with reference to the social groups (caste, religion or sect) to which they belong while getting involved in the political processes despite the fact that their political goals remain more or less identical. By helping to articulate the political voice of the marginalized, democracy in India has led to ‘a loosening of social strictures’ and empowered the peripherals to be confident of their ability to improve the socio-economic conditions in which they are placed. This is a significant political process that had led to a silent revolution through a meaningful transfer of power from the upper caste elites to various subaltern groups within the democratic framework of public governance.

Education, without a doubt, has an important functional, instrumental and utilitarian dimension. This is revealed when one asks questions such as ‘what is the purpose of education ?’. The answers, too often, are ‘to acquire qualifications for employment/upward mobility’, ‘wider/higher (in terms of income) opportunities’, and ‘to meet the needs for trained human power in diverse fields for national development’. But in its deepest sense education is not instrumentalist. That is to say, it is not to be justified outside of itself because it leads to the acquisition of formal skills or of certain desired psychological – social attributes. It must be respected in itself. Education is thus not a commodity to be acquired or possessed and then used, but a process of inestimable importance to individuals and society, although it can and does have enormous use-value. Education then, is a process of expansion and conversion, not in the sense of converting or turning students into doctors or engineers, but the widening and turning out of the mind — the creation, sustenance and development of self-critical awareness and independence of thought. It is an inner process of moral – intellectual development.

Most champions of democracy have been rather reticent in suggesting that democracy would itself promote development and enhancement of social welfare — they have tended to see them as good but distinctly separate and largely independent goals. The detractors of democracy, on the other hand, seemed to have been quite willing to express their diagnosis of what they see as serious tensions between democracy and development. The theorists of the practical split — “Make up your mind : do you want democracy, or instead, do you want development ?” — often came, at least to start with, from East Asian countries, and their voice grew in influence as several of these countries were immensely successful — through the 1970s and 1980s and even later — in promoting economic growth without pursuing democracy.
To deal with these issues we have to pay particular attention to both the content of what can be called development and to the interpretation of democracy (in particular to the respective roles of voting and of public reasoning). The assessment of development cannot be divorced from the lives that people can lead and the real freedom that they enjoy. Development can scarcely be seen merely in terms of enhancement of inanimate objects of convenience, such as a rise in the GNP (or in personal incomes), or industrialization — important as they may be as means to the real ends. Their value must depend on what they do to the lives and freedom of the people involved, which must be central to the idea of development.
If development is understood in a broader way, with a focus on human lives, then it becomes immediately clear that the relation between development and democracy has to be seen partly in terms of their constitutive connection, rather than only through their external links. Even though the question has often been asked whether political freedom is “conducive to development”, we must not miss the crucial recognition that political liberties and democratic rights are among the “constituent components” of development. Their relevance for development does not have to be established indirectly through their contribution to the growth of GNP.

For fourteen and a half months I lived in my little cell or room in the Dehradun jail, and I began to feel as if I was almost a part of it. I was familiar with every bit of it, I knew every mark and dent on the whitewashed walls and on the uneven floor and the ceiling with its moth-eaten rafters. In the little yard outside I greeted little tufts of grass and odd bits of stone as old friends. I was not alone in my cell, for several colonies of wasp and hornets lived there, and many lizards found a home behind the rafters, emerging in the evenings in search of prey.

Today’s developing economies use much less energy per capita than developed countries such as the United States did at similar incomes, showing the potential for lower-carbon growth. Adaptation and mitigation need to be integrated into a climate-smart development strategy that increases resilience, reduces the threat of further global warming, and improves development outcomes. Adaptation and mitigation measures can advance development, and prosperity can raise incomes and foster better institutions. A healthier population living in better-built houses and with access to bank loans and social security is better equipped to deal with a changing climate and its consequences. Advancing robust, resilient development policies that promote adaptation is needed today because changes in the climate, already begun, will increase even in the short term.
The spread of economic prosperity has always been intertwined with adaptation to changing ecological conditions. But as growth has altered the environment and as environmental change has accelerated, sustaining growth and adaptability demands greater capacity to understand our environment, generate new adaptive technologies and practices, and diffuse them widely. As economic historians have explained, much of humankind’s creative potential has been directed at adapting to the changing world. But adaptation cannot cope with all the impacts related to climate change, especially as larger changes unfold in the long term.
Countries cannot grow out of harm’s way fast enough to match the changing climate. And some growth strategies, whether driven by the government or the market, can also add to vulnerability — particularly if they overexploit natural resources. Under the Soviet development plan, irrigated cotton cultivation expanded in water-stressed Central Asia and led to the near disappearance of the Aral Sea, threatening the livelihoods of fishermen, herders and farmers. And clearing mangroves — the natural coastal buffers against storm surges — to make way for intensive farming or housing development, increases the physical vulnerability of coastal settlements, whether in Guinea or in Louisiana.